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Hudson Fair Trade Case-The Need for
Constitutional Amendment
Richard W. Pogue *
C ONGRESSMAN CELLER'S FAMOUS PREDICTION that "the courts will
have the devil's own job to unravel the tangle" I (of the
Robinson-Patman Act) could aptly be applied to the judicial
tangle of the fair trade decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
on May 8, 1963-Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. The Upjohn Co.,
Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
2
In the Hudson cases, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the 1959 Ohio Fair Trade Act3 by a 3-4 decision. The minority-
vote decision affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County that the 1959 Fair Trade Act was constitu-
tional as required by the following sentence from Article IV, Sec-
tion 2 of the Ohio Constitution:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the
supreme court without the concurrence of at least all but one
of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the
court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void.
Neither the three members speaking for the Court nor the four
dissenters adverted to the confusion inevitably arising from a
minority decision on constitutionality.
Since enactment of the original fair trade statute in Cali-
fornia in 1931,4 fair trade has had a tortuous and litigious career.
Eventually all but four states (Alaska, Missouri, Texas and Ver-
mont) passed fair trade laws; by latest unofficial count fair trade
statutes other than Ohio's have been held unconstitutional at
least in part in 21 states, and have been upheld in their entirety
in 19 states. 5 The many arguments pro and con are not repeated
* BA., Cornell University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School; mem-
ber of the law firm of Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, of Cleveland; etc.
1 80 Cong. Rec. 9419 (1936).
2 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N. E. 2d 460 (1963).
3 §§ 1333.27-1333.34, Ohio Rev. Code. "Fair Trade" as used here of course
refers to legislatively authorized vertical resale price maintenance.
4 Calif. Laws 1931, Ch. 278. Fair trade legislation has traditionally relied
on contract doctrines as the basis for a resale price maintenance. But as
early as 1916, New Jersey passed a statute providing for resale price main-
tenance by notice affixed to the goods. The statute was upheld and applied
in Robert H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. Haline & Co., 89 N. J. Eq. 332, 108 A. 128(1918).
5 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. par. 6041.
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here; they abound in the legal literature.( In simplest summary,
the legislative and judicial clash has been between the general
philosophy of the Sherman Act 7 opposing restraints on competi-
tion (including vertical resale price maintenance) and the dual
justification for the fair trade exemption from the Sherman Act
where authorized by state law-the interest of a brand owner in
protecting the property in his brand8 and, emphasized much of
late (particularly in the light of the modern rash of "discount"
operations), the interest of independent retailers in enjoying
satisfactory profit margins.( Proponents and opponents have as-
serted that the "public interest" supports their positions.
Developments in Ohio are illustrative of the checkered pat-
tern of success of fair trade.
Ohio adopted its first Fair Trade Act in 1936.10 The 1958
Bargain Fair"' decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, striking
down the nonsigner provision of the 1936 Act as unconstitutional,
did not draw a dissent from the Court. The Court's very brief
6 See, for example, bibliography in Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Laws-
Cases and Comments 181, n. 1 (2d ed. 1959).
7 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
8 "The value of any trademark is, of course, the demand for the product
which it represents. The continued discount selling of a trademarked prod-
uct eventually cheapens it in the eyes of the purchasing public. If such
product is sold at a reduced price, the public will eventually get the idea
that the product is cheap and turn to others, seeking higher quality mer-
chandise." Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487, 495,
190 N. E. 2d 460 (1963).
9 "Even to the most casual observer it is readily apparent that the small
independent merchant is gradually being forced out of business through
the operation of the large merchandising establishments. * * * [A]s a
result of the discounting of fair-trade merchandise, so much of his trade
is being drained from him that he cannot afford to continue his business.
Clearly, it is to the advantage of the general public that such establishments
be preserved." Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487,
494 (1963).
10 Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 1333.07 et seq.
11 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182,
147 N. E. 2d 481 (1958). A typical "nonsigner" clause, such as that contained
in the 1936 Ohio act, provides that wilfully and knowingly advertising,
offering for sale or selling fair traded commodities (i.e., those branded
commodities as to which the manufacturer has entered into a contract pro-
viding for resale price maintenance) at less than the stipulated prices,
whether by a party to the contract or by some other person, is unfair com-
petition actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby. Taft, J.,
wrote a separate concurring opinion in Bargain Fair which would have
avoided the constitutional issue by holding that the fair trade agreement
before the Court, upon which operation of the nonsigner provision de-
pended, was not a "contract" because of lack of any definite promises by





statement of reasons for its decision, following citation of repre-
sentative decisions in other states either for or against fair trade,
seems to be tripartite: the 1936 Act (with respect to a nonsigner
provision, under which the suit in Bargain Fair was brought) was
(a) an unauthorized exercise of the police power since there was
no substantial relation to the public safety, morals or general wel-
fare, (b) in contravention of the due process provision of the
Ohio Bill of Rights (by depriving the retailer of the privilege of
disposing of his property on his own terms), and (c) a delegation
of legislative power and discretion to private persons.
The reaction of the legislature was prompt and decisive. In
1959, one year after Bargain Fair, it enacted a "notice" type fair
trade statute, such as had been adopted in Virginia. The votes
in overruling the Governor's veto were 112-6 in the House and
30-3 in the Senate. The heart of the new statute12 was the "im-
plied contract" concept-any distributor (reseller) "who, with
notice that the proprietor (brand owner) has established a mini-
mum resale price for a commodity, accepts such commodity shall
thereby have entered into an agreement with such proprietor not
to resell such commodity at less than the minimum price stipu-
lated therefor by such proprietor." The statute provides that a
person who sells, offers to sell or advertises such a commodity at
a price lower than the established minimum resale price, hav-
ing acquired the commodity after notice, commits an unfair act
of competition.
Shortly after enactment, a rash of fair trade litigation com-
menced in various courts in the State. The companion Hudson
cases which ultimately reached the Supreme Court were two of
several declaratory judgment actions brought by a retailer in the
Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County seeking to have
the law declared invalid, in which the defendant manufacturers
cross-petitioned for fair trade enforcement. Trial in these two
cases was held only on the (amended) petitions, not the cross-
petitions as well; by stipulation the causes were tried on affi-
davits and exhibits and the deposition of the sales manager of
the Cleveland branch of Upjohn.
On July 28, 1960, Judge McNeill (of Van Wert County,
sitting by designation) held the 1959 statute unconstitutional on
the ground that it constituted an improper delegation of legis-
12 Ohio Rev. Code, sections 1333.27-1333.34, inclusive.
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lative authority.13 On July 13, 1961, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Judicial District (Cuyahoga County) reversed., in a 2-1
decision.14 The majority opinion relied heavily on the United
States Supreme Court decision in the Old Dearborn case, 15 which
had rejected arguments that one of the early fair trade acts vio-
lated federal delegation of authority, due process and equal pro-
tection requirements; the opinion did not refer to or discuss the
opinion of Judge McNeill. The brief dissenting opinion stated
that the judge was "in accord with the opinion" of Judge McNeill.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmance two years later again
demonstrated the closeness of the fair trade issue. The Court's
opinion concluded that the constitutional objections to the 1936
Act expressed in Bargain Fair had been met in the new statute.
After discussion of the dual justifications offered for fair trade
noted above, the Court concluded:
When the general welfare of the small merchant is con-
sidered together with the necessity of protecting the good-
will and value attached to a trademark, it was clearly within
the legislative power to enact such protective legislation, and
the court will not substitute its judgment in this instance
for that of the General Assembly.' 6
Differentiating the 1936 and 1959 Acts, the Court emphasized
that the 1959 Act "introduces into the law two entirely new con-
cepts"- (1) the concept that a trademark owner retains a pro-
prietary interest in a trademarked commodity after he has sold
it to distributors (because of his interest in stimulating demand
for the commodity and in protecting the goodwill associated with
the trademark), and (2) the "notice" concept under which a dis-
tributor who accepts a commodity with notice that the trade-
mark owner has established a minimum resale price therefor
"shall thereby have entered into an agreement 17 [with the trade-
mark owner] not to resell such commodity at less than the mini-
'3 Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 1960 CCH Trade Cases para.
69,778 (1960).
14 Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 18 Ohio Op. 2d 182, 176 N. E.
2d 236 (Ohio App. 1961).
15 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 229 U. S. 183
(1936).
16 Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487, 495. (See notes
supra.)
17 The retailer in the Hudson case argued the legislatively-recognized
contract did not constitute a "contract or agreement" within the meaning
of those terms in the McGuire Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45(a), and thus the




mum price." The Court observed that Article XIII, Section 2-
providing that the General Assembly can pass laws "regulating
the sale and conveyance" of personal property--"should not be
read out of the Ohio Constitution or rendered meaningless."
The brief dissenting opinion of Zimmerman, J., who had
written the Court's opinion in Bargain Fair, stated that the
reasons expressed in Bargain Fair "are still valid in relation to
the new act."
Thus the implied contract provision was a sufficient basis for
distinguishing the 1936 Act and the Bargain Fair decision, in the
view of the Court.'
There is little that is new in the substantive fair trade aspects
of the Hudson case aside from the crucial fact that the Court felt
that the notice provision was a basis of distinction between the
1936 and 1959 Acts. The debate as to fair trade goes on.
Perhaps of greater academic interest is the reminder again of
the peculiar Ohio constitutional clause under which Hudson was
affirmed, quoted above. This "minority control" provision,
adopted by the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912, has
caused the courts and counsel many headaches and has promoted
a considerable volume of litigation in its half-century of opera-
tion. Its original purpose has been explained as follows:
What were the objectives sought by the convention of
1912? It must be remembered that the convention met in a
year when a progressive movement was at its height. Theo-
dore Roosevelt and his followers bolted the Republican Party
in that year, and Woodrow Wilson was elected President of
the United States. Furthermore, in the period immediately
prior to and after the meeting of the convention, workmen's
compensation laws were passed by a large majority of the
states, and numerous other acts regulating hours of labor
and other labor conditions were being enacted. Many of
these acts met with unfavorable reception in the courts, par-
ticularly in the highest courts of the states and the nation.
As a result the progressives felt that the courts were out of
sympathy with the wishes of the people, and that it would
18 In upholding a similar "notice" statute, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals referred to the "elimination of the coercive 'non-signer' provision
[of the old statute] and inclusion of the permissively contractual pro-
vision" of the new act (i.e., the contract by notice provision). Standard
Drug Co. v. General Electric Co., 1960 Trade Cases par. 69,858 (1960). The
Court was not specifically faced with the issue of distinction since the
earlier Virginia decision, Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S. E.
2d 384 (1956), had been decided not on constitutional grounds but on the
ground that the earlier Virginia fair trade act had been repealed by im-
plication by reason of subsequent antitrust legislation in Virginia.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
be necessary to reform the courts in order to put the new
programs into operation. Theodore Roosevelt advocated the
recall of judicial decision on constitutional questions, while
William J. Bryan looked not unfavorably upon a plan to re-
quire unanimous approval of the supreme court before a
legislative act should be declared unconstitutional.
In the Ohio Constitutional Convention there was a very
pronounced opinion to the effect that the state supreme court
was too far removed from the people, and, its powers in
favor, first, of the lower courts, and, second, of the legisla-
ture. * * * 19
Intended to be a check on judicial review, the provision has
been severely criticized in rather outspoken language in several
opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio. In 1927 the Court stated
that "members of this Court deplore such a constitutional pro-
vision"; 20 seven years later the Court, opining that this view de-
ploring the provision "reflects the general sentiment of our bench
and bar," also described the effect of the provision as "a situa-
tion already anomalous in our judicial system." 21 In another
opinion the Court observed that the provision "places this Court
in an unenviable, not to say ridiculous, light before courts and
lawyers of other states." 22
The weird results which may flow from this unhappy experi-
ment in constitutional control of the judiciary are illustrated in
the long and untidy history of litigation involving Section 3963
of the old Ohio General Code, which prohibited a city or village
from making a charge for supplying water for use in public
school buildings. Among the many decisions on the constitu-
tionality of this statute, the following skeleton collection il-
lustrates the problems created by the constitutional minority
vote provision.
In the East Cleveland case23 in 1925 the Supreme Court af-
firmed, in a 2-5 decision, a ruling of constitutionality of Section
19 Stene, Is There Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio, 9 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 23 at 25 (1935). North Dakota and Nebraska enacted similar constitu-
tional amendments in 1918 and 1920, respectively. See Dodd, The Course of
Judicial Review in the State of Ohio, 25 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 367 at 374, n. 30
(1931). See n. 34, infra.
20 State ex rel. Jones v. Zangerle, 117 Ohio St. 507, 511, 159 N. E. 564 (1927).
21 Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 354, 356, 191 N. E. 364 (1934).
22 Board of Education v. City of Columbus, 118 Ohio St. 295, 305, 160 N. E.
902 (1928).





3963 by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District. The same
parties apparently then took the same issue to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth District; it also upheld the constitutionality
of Section 3963.24 In 1928 the same issue arose in the Columbus
case, 25 an appeal from a ruling of unconstitutionality of Section
3963 by the Court of Appeals for the Second District; the five dis-
senting judges in the East Cleveland case, now speaking for the
Court, affirmed the judgment below and noted that the effect of
the Court's ruling was as follows:
* * * In the Second appellate district section 3963 is un-
constitutional and void, and must be so treated by all the
municipalities of that district. In the Eighth and Ninth ap-
pellate districts the statute is valid, and must be so ad-
ministered. In the other six appellate districts, municipalities
may not know whether that section is valid and applicable
to municipalities within their jurisdictions until the ques-
tion has been submitted to the various courts of appeals of
those districts, but all municipalities in those districts may
be assured that whatever judgments are rendered by their
respective Courts of Appeals will be affirmed by this court
until such time as either the constitutional provision is abro-
gated or changes occur in the personnel of this court. It
would be difficult to describe or even imagine a more de-
plorable situation.2 6
The Court of Appeals which was affirmed in the Columbus case
had stated that it had not decided the case upon the opinions in
the East Cleveland case but upon its own judgment, and the Su-
preme Court approved this method on analogy to the principle
that a decision by a federal court evenly divided is not an au-
thoritative precedent.
Subsequently the Court of Common Pleas for Licking
County, in the Fifth District, considered the same issue. It held
Section 3963 unconstitutional 27 on the theory that a Common
Pleas Court should follow the latest pronouncement of the Su-
preme Court (then the Columbus case) until reversed by its own
Court of Appeals.
24 Referred to in Board of Education v. City of Columbus, supra note 22.
The same result of constitutionality of sec. 3963 was reached in a suit be-
tween the same parties after the 1925 East Cleveland case in City of East
Cleveland v. Board of Education, 25 Ohio App. 192, 157 N. E. 575 (Eighth
District 1927).
25 Board of Education v. City of Columbus, supra note 22.
26 118 Ohio St. 295, 299 (1928).
27 City of Newark v. Board of Education, 28 Ohio Nisi Prius (N. S.) 297
(Ohio Com. P1. 1931).
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Eventually Section 3963 was declared unconstitutional by the
constitutional majority of six members of the Supreme Court
(its personnel having changed) in Board of Education v. Village
of Willard,28 and the result was interpreted as creating "the now
statewide unconstitutionality of the statute." 20 Oddly, the Wil-
lard case was not even cited in a 1944 Court of Appeals opinion
in the Second District,30 the court relying solely upon the 1928
Columbus decision as fixing the unconstitutionality of Section
3963 in the Second District.
There were numerous other decisions involving Section 3963;
but the key point is that during the 10-year period between the
1925-minority-vote decision of constitutionality in the East Cleve-
land case and the 1935 six-vote decision of unconstitutionality in
the Willard case, the status of the law was in hopeless confusion.
Is there an advantage gained sufficient to offset this con-
fusion? A system of litigating a statute appellate district by
appellate district may produce activity for attorneys but it
has little else to commend it, at least where the issues are not
essentially local matters inevitably turning on peculiar fact and
policy factors in each community. And what of the asserted evils
which led the Constitutional Convention 50 years ago to adopt
this unique provision? The judicial climate has changed markedly
since 1912; at that time there was much popular discussion of
techniques for curbing what was considered excessive judicial
power in striking down state statutes. While current proposals
to limit the power of the United States Supreme Court, at least
in certain defined areas, have been made, these are specialized
efforts not directed to limiting judicial power generally.
But the fact that judicial disposition to invalidate economic
legislation has waned markedly in the decades since the 1912
Convention is not the only reason, in addition to those present
at the time of adoption, that time has shown to support deletion of
this Ohio provision. One point, emphasized by legal history, is
that the provision applies to all constitutional issues involving
state statutes, not just those of the categories which concerned
the Convention. More importantly, the Section 3963 history and
other examples demonstrate that this was not a sound method of
28 130 Ohio St. 311, 199 N. E. 74 (1935).
29 Kasch v. Peoples Hospital Co., 54 Ohio App. 80, 83, 5 N. E. 2d 1020 (1936).





accomplishing the intended result. To permit up to nine or ten
courts of last resort in the state on fundamental constitutional
issues, depending on how and when the issue is litigated, sacri-
fices the usually desirable result of uniformity of law and breeds
uncertainty and litigation. The legal history shows that even if
the original purpose of limitation of judicial power were thought
to be salutary, the "except" clause was necessarily a litigation-
fomenting device. There seems to be little sentiment in support
of the continued existence of this unique constitutional provision
in Ohio.
As to the Hudson case, this peculiar Ohio constitutional pro-
vision injects another legal issue into fair trade enforcement.
The legal history of fair trade statutes has been one of constant
litigation. Many parties have asserted and litigated many legal
issues in fair trade cases; and this background is support for the
view that the Hudson decision is not the last word in interpreta-
tion and application of the 1959 Ohio Fair Trade Act.
Assuming that there will be further litigation, what are the
scope and effect of the Hudson decision? Already one question
arises. In several cases in the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County,3 1 the 1959 Fair Trade Act has been held unconstitu-
tional. In some of these cases the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal of right "for the reason that no debatable constitutional
question is involved." 32 Thus, under the Columbus case rationale
(or at least until the Court of Appeals for Franklin County
acts again) the statute is constitutional in Cuyahoga County
and unconstitutional in Franklin County. The state of the law in
the counties in the judicial districts other than the Second and
the Eighth is, to state it most graciously, unclear. Perhaps each
Court of Common Pleas, and then each Court of Appeals, for
these other counties, can reach its own independent decision;
perhaps, under the Licking County Common Pleas analysis noted
above, Courts of Common Pleas and perhaps even Courts of Ap-
peals in these other counties should follow Hudson, it now being
the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the issue. But
clarification must await decisions of the courts.
31 See Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus Vitamin and Cosmetic Distribu-
tors, Inc., 1962 CCH Trade Cases par. 70,360 (Franklin C. A. 1962).
32 See Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus Vitamin and Cosmetic Distribu-
tors, Inc., 1963 CCH Trade Cases par. 70,782 (1963). The significance of this
action is doubtful, particularly since the appellant was apparently the dis-
count house, which was the successful party in the Court of Appeals.
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Thus the Hudson case has dual significance. First, it is im-
portant in its holding of a relatively new concept in fair trade leg-
islation-the "notice" or "implied contract" doctrine under which
resellers are deemed to have entered into a legislatively defined
contract by accepting goods with notice of the fair trade price
limitations. This concept, previously upheld in Virginia, finds its
counterpart in the current Quality Stabilization Bills pending in
Congress which would include provision for a federal right to en-
force resale price maintenance against resellers of branded com-
modities who are given prior notice of price restrictions. 33
A second respect in which the Hudson case may acquire sig-
nificance lies in the renewed attention to Article IV, Section 2
of the Ohio Constitution which it may invite, depending on fu-
ture developments in litigation under the 1959 Ohio Fair Trade
Act. Wholly apart from whatever view one takes toward fair
trade, the Hudson decision serves as a reminder that this Ohio
constitutional provision has not worked well throughout its
history and the asserted need for the provision is not present
now, whatever the situation may have been in 1912. Its repeal
was recommended in connection with the 1952 submission to the
electorate of the question of the desirability of a convention to
amend or revise the state constitution; 34 undoubtedly repeal of
this provision will be suggested again in connection with the
next constitutionally required vote on the desirability of such
a convention in 1972, if not before. Whether the subsequent
history of Hudson will be important at that time cannot be fore-
seen. But the case has value in calling attention to a constitu-
tional oddity which by its nature serves to frustrate uniformity
of law. 35
33 E.g., H. R. 3669, 88th Congress.
34 Deletion was proposed in Report of the Committee on Ohio Judicial
System, Ohio State Bar Association, 24 Ohio Bar 654, 658 (1951). Argu-
ments in favor of, and against, the basic objective were summarized in an
early article, Cushman, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the
Court, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 771, 797-803 (1921). Neither the Nebraska nor the
North Dakota provision includes a counterpart of Ohio's "except" clause
with respect to lower court rulings. Neb. Constn., Art. V, Sec. 2, 2 Rev. Stat.
Neb. 118-119 (1943) (5 of 7 judges required for ruling of unconstitutionality);
N. D. Constn. Sec. 89, 13 N. D. Century Code 183 (1960) (4 of 5 judges re-
quired).
35 The effect of Hudson on other fair trade cases is in litigation; the fore-
going is intended to suggest the need to amend the Constitution in the fu-
ture, and not to indicate how it should be applied in any case under the
existing provision.
Sept., 1963
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